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Abstract
We propose a two-stream network for face tampering de-
tection. We train GoogLeNet to detect tampering artifacts in
a face classification stream, and train a patch based triplet
network to leverage features capturing local noise residu-
als and camera characteristics as a second stream. In ad-
dition, we use two different online face swapping applica-
tions to create a new dataset that consists of 2010 tampered
images, each of which contains a tampered face. We evalu-
ate the proposed two-stream network on our newly collected
dataset. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness
of our method.
1. Introduction
People post photos every day on popular social websites
such as Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. A considerable
number of these photos are authentic as they are generated
from people’s real life and shared as a part of their social ex-
perience. However, maliciously or not, more and more tam-
pered images, especially ones involving face regions, are
emerging on the Internet. Image splicing, which is the most
common tampering manipulation, is the process of cutting
one part of a source image, such as the face regions, and
inserting it in the target image. To make the tampered result
more realistic, adjustments on the shape, boundary, illumi-
nation and scaling are necessary, which make tamper de-
tection challenging. Given advances in face detection and
recognition techniques, anyone is able to swap faces with
low cost using mobile applications [2] or open-source soft-
ware [1]. Some tampered image examples generated from
commercial software are shown in Figure 1. Even after
close inspection, people mistake the tampered faces as orig-
inal, and the current face verification techniques [22, 24]
will also determine the source face and the tampered face
are from the same identity. The consequence would be even
more serious if manipulated images are used for political or
commercial purposes.
∗The first two authors contribute equally to this work.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 1. Examples of tampered faces. (a) original image. (b)
Tampered image. The face in the middle has been tampered. (c)
Original image. (d) Tampered image. The face on the right has
been tampered.
Even though image tampering detection has been an ac-
tive research area during the last decade, limitations still
exist for current approaches since they focus on a particular
source of tampering evidence [20, 14, 4, 11]. For exam-
ple, local noise analysis fails to deal with tampered images
constructed using careful post processing and Color Filter
Array (CFA) models cannot deal with resized images.
To avoid focusing on specific tampering evidence and
achieve robust tampering detection, we propose a two-
stream network architecture to capture both tampering ar-
tifact evidence and local noise residual evidence as shown
in Figure 2. This is inspired by recent research on CNNs
showing the potential to learn tampering evidence [3, 21, 7]
and rich models [15, 9, 10, 16], which are models of the
noise components that produce informative features for ste-
ganalysis and we call the features produced by these mod-
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Figure 2. Illustration of our two-stream network. The face classification stream models visual appearance by classifying a face is tampered
or not. The patch triplet stream is trained on steganalysis features to ensure patches from the same image are close in the embedding space,
and an SVM trained on the learned features classifies each patch. Finally, the scores of two streams are fused to recognize a tampered face.
els “steganalysis features” in the rest of this paper, show-
ing good performance on tampering detection. One of our
streams is a CNN based face classification stream and the
other one is a steganalysis feature based triplet stream. The
face classification stream, based on GoogLeNet [23], is
trained on tampered and authentic images and serves as a
tampered face classifier. The patch triplet stream, based
on patch level steganalysis features [15, 16], captures low-
level camera characteristics like CFA pattern and local noise
residuals. Instead of utilizing steganalysis features directly,
we train a triplet network after extracting steganalysis fea-
tures to allow the model to refine steganalysis features.
Combining the two streams reveals both evidence of high-
level tampering artifacts and low-level noise residual fea-
tures, and yields very good performance for face tamper de-
tection.
To train and evaluate our approach, we created a new
face tampering dataset. The new dataset overcomes the
drawback of existing datasets [19, 13, 12, 11] that are either
small or in which the tampering is easily distinguishable
even through visual inspection. We chose two face swap-
ping apps to create two parallel sets of tampered images
where the same target face is swapped with the same source
face, but using different swapping algorithms. Only tam-
pered images of good quality were retained. There are 1005
tampered images for each tampering technique (2010 tam-
pered images in total) and 1400 authentic images for each
subset. Evaluation on this dataset shows the effectiveness
of our approach.
Our contribution is two-fold. First, by incorporating
GoogLeNet and the triplet network as a two-stream network
architecture, our method learns both tampering artifacts and
local noise residual features. In addition, we create a new
challenging dataset specific to face region tampering detec-
tion.
2. Related Work
There is growing research activity on tampering detec-
tion and localization. Prior methods can be classified ac-
cording to the image features that they target, such as lo-
cal noise estimation [20], double JPEG localization [4],
CFA pattern analysis [14], illumination model [11] and ste-
ganalysis feature classification [8]. Recently, some methods
based on Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) [3, 7, 21]
have achieved very good results.
The premise behind local noise estimation based tech-
niques is that the difference between global noise charac-
teristics and local noise characteristics reveals the hidden
tampered regions. For example, Lyu et al. [18] cast noise
statistic estimation as a closed-form optimization problem.
By exploiting the property of kurtosis of natural images in
band-pass domains and the relationship between noise char-
acteristics and kurtosis, they reveal the inconsistency be-
tween global noise and local noise. However, the assump-
tion that local noise is inconsistent with global noise fails if
post processing techniques like filtering or image blending
are applied after splicing. In contrast, our method is built
on a triplet network to learn local noise residuals. This pro-
vides more reliable features for detection.
Double JPEG localization techniques can be classified
into aligned double JPEG compression and non-aligned
double JPEG compression, depending on whether or not
the quantization factors align well after two applications
of JPEG compression to the same image. The assumption
is that the background regions undergo double JPEG com-
pression while the tampered regions do not. For example,
Bianchi et al. [4] presented a probability model that esti-
mates DCT coefficients together with quantization factors.
The advantage of this method is that it can be used for both
aligned double JPEG and non-aligned double JPEG. How-
ever, this kind of technique strongly depends on the double
JPEG assumption.
CFA localization based methods assume that the CFA
pattern differs between tampered regions and authentic re-
gions, due to the use of different imaging devices or other
low-level artifacts introduced by the tampering process. By
estimating the CFA pattern for the tampered image, it is
possible to distinguish the tampered regions and authen-
tic regions from each other. For example, Ferrara et al.
[14] proposed an algorithm that estimates the camera fil-
ter pattern based on the fact that the variance of prediction
error between CFA present regions (authentic regions) and
CFA absent regions (tampered regions) is different. After
a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) classification, the tam-
pered regions can be localized. However, the assumption
might not hold true if the tampered region has similar CFA
pattern or the whole image is resized (whole resizing de-
stroys the original camera CFA information and introduces
new noise). Even though our method is also built on a CFA
aware steganalysis features, we have a second stream that
provides additional evidence in such scenarios.
Illumination based methods aim to detect illumination
inconsistencies between tampered regions and authentic re-
gions. For example, the tampered face and another face
in the background may have different light source direc-
tions. Carvalho et al. [5] were able to estimate the light
source direction for objects in an image, and thus use the
light inconsistency to locate the tampered regions. De et al.
[11] extracted the illumination features from image and use
a Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier for tampering
classification. For face tamper detection, the performance
can degrade as some applications only modify a small re-
gion of the tampered face, leaving the global illumination
features of the face relatively unaltered.
Steganalysis feature [15] based methods extract diverse
low-level information like local noise residuals. The ste-
ganalysis feature is a local descriptor based on cooccurrence
statistics of nearby pixel noise residuals obtained from mul-
tiple linear and non-linear filters. Cozzolino et al. [8] used
simplified steganalysis features and built a single Gaussian
model to identify tampered regions. An improved method is
[10], which treated tamper detection as anomaly detection
and used a discriminative learning autoencoder outlier re-
moving method based on steganalysis features. These meth-
ods show that steganalysis features are quite useful as low-
level features which can be used in tamper detection. Gol-
jan et al. [16] showed that this steganalysis model can also
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Figure 3. Illustration of weakly-supervised triplet network. By
minimizing the triplet loss, the distance between patches from the
same image (anchor and positive patches in the left image) in the
learned embedding space becomes smaller than distance between
two patches from different images (anchor patch in the left image
and negative patch in the right image). Two boxes and circles of
the same color represent a patch and its corresponding embedding,
respectively.
be utilized to estimate and extract CFA features, which ex-
tends their application. The difference between CFA aware
steganalysis features and our approach is that we fine tune
these features to improve their detection performance.
Recently, methods based on CNNs have been developed.
For example, by adding an additional median filter layer
before the first convolutional layer, Chen et al. [7] achieved
good performance in median filtering tampering. Bayar et
al. [3] designed an adaptive filter kernel layer to estimate the
filter kernel used in the tampering process, detecting vari-
ous filtering tampered contents. However, the performance
degrades significantly when multiple post processing tech-
niques are applied to tampered regions. Rao et al. [21] com-
bined a CNN with steganalysis features by initializing the
kernel of the first convolution layer with steganalysis filter
kernels.
3. Approach
Figure 2 shows our two stream framework. The face
classification stream is a CNN trained to classify whether
a face image is tampered or authentic. Thus, it learns the
artifacts created by the tampering process. The patch triplet
stream, which is trained on steganalysis features [16] of im-
age patches with a triplet loss, models the traces left by in-
camera processing and local noise characteristics.
3.1. Face Classification Stream
Since face tampering often creates artifacts (strong edges
near lips, blurred areas on forehead, etc.), the visual infor-
mation present in the tampered face plays an important role
in tampered face detection. We adapt a deep convolutional
neural network [23] trained for large-scale image recogni-
tion task, and fine-tune it to classify if a face is tampered or
not. Given a face qi, we denote the tampering score of this
CNN as F (qi).
3.2. Patch Triplet Stream
In addition to modeling the visual appearance of tam-
pered faces, we also leverage informative clues hidden in
the in-camera processing for accurate tampered face detec-
tion. Recent research has shown that co-occurrence based
local features (e.g., steganalysis features [16]) can capture
this hidden information and are effective in image splicing
detection [10, 8]. In contrast to previous works that directly
use these features, we refine the steganalysis features by a
data-driven approach based on a triplet loss [22]. By train-
ing this triplet network, we ensure that a pair of patches
from the same image are closer in the learned embedding
space, while the distance between a pair of patches from
two different images is large, as shown in Figure 3.
Formally, given an image patch xa (anchor patch), a
patch xp (positive patch) from the same image, and xn (neg-
ative patch) from a different image, we enforce that the dis-
tance between xa and xp is smaller than that between xa
and xn by some margin m:
d(f(r(xa)), f(r(xp)))+m < d(f(r(xa)), f(r(xn))) (1)
where r(x) is the steganalysis features of patch x, f(r(x))
is the embedding of x we want to learn, and d() is the sum
of squares distance measure. We model f by a two layer
fully connected neural network.
This constraint is then converted into minimizing the fol-
lowing loss function:
L(f) =
∑
a,p,n
max(0,m+ d(fa, fp)− d(fa, fn)) (2)
where we use fa to denote f(r(xa)) for simplicity. Instead
of generating hard negatives in an online fashion [22], we
randomly sample 15000 patch triplets from authentic im-
ages. Each triplet contains three 128 × 128 patches (one
anchor, one positive, and one negative patch). We do not
use hard negative sampling because our method is weakly
supervised - for an anchor patch, its negative patches might
be from the images taken from the same camera, thus have
the same camera characteristics. During hard negative min-
ing, these pseudo negatives will be treated as true hard neg-
atives and the model will eventually project all patches into
the same point in the embedding space in order to minimize
L.
The triplet network is designed to determine whether or
not two patches come from the same image. Face tamper-
ing detection works in a similar way. All the patches in an
authentic region are from the same image and have small
distances between each other in triplet embedding space,
while the patches in tampered face regions have large dis-
tance from those authentic patches in the triplet embedding
space because they are from another image. For each tam-
pered image, the tampered regions have different character-
istics from the authentic regions.
Therefore, we treat the tampered and authentic regions
in each image as two different classes and train a classifier
for each image to predict the tampered regions. We choose
SVM as our classifier and train it for each test face on-the-
fly. This process is shown in Figure 4. The SVM samples
are obtained by extracting the triplet features on each patch
through sliding windows. We treat the features extracted
from non-face-region patches as negative samples because
they are from the same image. To balance the negative
samples, we randomly select the features extracted from
other image patches as positive samples. Only the features
from the automatically detected face regions in an image are
treated as test samples. (e.g., the left face of the test image
in Figure 4). If a face region has been tampered, then the
extracted features should have similar characteristics with
positive samples; otherwise they should be similar to neg-
ative samples. For a patch x, the prediction of this SVM
model S(x) indicates the probability that x is from another
image, and thus is equivalent to the probability of tamper-
ing. As a face might contain multiple patches, we then take
the average score for the patches in the face region as the
final score for the face.
3.3. Two-stream Score Fusion
At test time, the final score for a face q is obtained by
simply combining the output scores of the two streams:
F (q) + λ
1
Nq
∑
x∈q
S(x) (3)
where Nq is the number of patches inside face q. λ is a bal-
ance factor that ensures the two scores are at similar scale.
4. Experiments
In this section, we introduce our newly collected
SwapMe and FaceSwap dataset, and then evaluate our
method on it. Furthermore, we visualize the detection re-
sults of our method to better understand the proposed two-
stream network. Finally, different training and test proto-
cols are discussed.
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Figure 4. Demonstration of SVM training process. Suppose we want to test on the left face in the test image in a sliding window fashion.
Green boxes are the test face patches; red boxes are randomly selected patches from other images and used as positive samples; blue boxes
are the negative samples indicating patches from the same image. After SVM prediction, green boxes are more likely to be the ones from
other images and thus the left face in the test image is classified to be a tampered face.
4.1. SwapMe and FaceSwap Dataset
Even though datasets for image tampering detection ex-
ist [19, 12, 13, 11], they are not well suited for large scale
face tamper detection. Columbia Image Splicing dataset
[19] and CASIA [12, 13] are large but most of the tampered
regions are not human faces. DSI-1 dataset [11] focuses
on face tampering but the total number of tampered images
is only 25. Moreover, it is difficult to train deep learning
methods on these datasets for face tamper detection.
To this end, we created a dataset utilizing one iOS app
called SwapMe [2] and an open-source face swap applica-
tion called FaceSwap [1]. Given a source face and a tar-
get face, they automatically replace the target face with the
source face. Then, post processing such as boundary blur-
ring, resizing and blending is applied to the tampered face,
which makes it very difficult to visually distinguish the tam-
pered from authentic images. Some examples created by
SwapMe and FaceSwap are shown in Figure 5.
We selected 1005 target-source face pairs, and generated
1005 images with one tampered face in each image for each
of the two applications. We further split these 1005 images
into 705 for training and 300 for testing. The 705 training
images together with another 1400 authentic images form
the training set. The 300 test images are combined with 300
authentic images as the test set. For each test image, two
faces are sampled for testing (one tampered and one authen-
tic for a tampered image, and two authentic faces for an au-
thentic image). Thus, in total, for each application, we have
705 tampered faces and 1400 authentic faces for training,
and 900 authentic faces and 300 tampered faces for testing.
Note that the selected images cover diverse events (e.g., hol-
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 5. Examples of tampered images using SwapMe and
FaceSwap. (a) Source image. The red bounding box shows the
face moved to the tampered images. (b) Target image. The red
bounding box shows the face before tampering. (c) Tampered im-
age using SwapMe. (d) Tampered image using FaceSwap.
idays, sports, conferences) and identities of different ages,
genders and races. When needed, the face bounding boxes
are generated using Dlib [17] face detection.
Our dataset has the following advantages: 1) It is a large
dataset focus on face regions and is specifically designed for
face tamper detection. 2) The quality of tampering is very
good and the tampered faces look realistic. Generally, only
face regions like the mouth, skin or eyes are tampered. 3)
Since we use two different tampering techniques, we avoid
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Figure 6. Face-level ROC comparison between our two-stream
network and other methods.
learning the artifacts of one swapping algorithm, which may
not be predictive when testing on the other.
4.2. Experiment Setup
Training and Test Protocol. In order to avoid learn-
ing application-specific features, we train our model on one
dataset and test on the other dataset. We train on FaceSwap
training subset and test on SwapMe test subset. This is
because tampering quality of FaceSwap is not as good as
SwapMe. We do this for two reasons. On one hand, it
might take attackers considerable effort to improve the tam-
pered image in order to confuse the viewer. On the other
hand, tamper detection algorithms typically will not know
the specific technique attackers used to tamper images. We
use the 705 FaceSwap tampered images and 1400 authentic
images for training, and 300 SwapMe tampered images to-
gether with 300 authentic images for testing. The face-level
tampering detection ROC curve and corresponding AUC
are used for evaluation.
Face Classification Stream. We use GoogLeNet Incep-
tion V3 model [23] for training the tampered face classifier.
Faces are resized to 299× 299 and provided as input to the
CNN. We set the initial learning rate to 0.1 and decrease it
by a factor of 2 every 8 epochs. The batch size is set to 32.
Finally we fine-tune all layers of the CNN pre-trained on
ImageNet and stop the training process after 16k steps.
Patch Triplet Stream. Each triplet contains 3 128×128
patches, and 5514D steganalysis features [16] are extracted
for each patch. We randomly sample 15000 such triplets
from authentic training images, of which 12000 are used
for training and 3000 for validation. The triplet network
contains two fully connected layers, the first layer contains
Methods AUC
IDC [4] 0.543
CFA pattern [14] 0.618
Steganalysis features [16] + SVM 0.794
Face classification stream 0.854
Patch triplet stream 0.875
Two-stream network (Ours) 0.927
Table 1. AUC of face-level ROC for different methods.
1024 neurons and the second one contains 512 neurons. The
output of this network is then L2 normalized. During train-
ing, the initial learning rate is set to 0.1 and decreased by 2
every 8 epochs. The margin m in Eqn. 1 is fixed to 0.04.
During testing, we extract image patches in a sliding win-
dow fashion (window size = 128, stride = 64). The 512D
learned representation is extracted for each patch then used
for training a linear SVM using liblinear [6] with C = 100.
Finally, we apply the trained SVM on face patches, and the
average score of face patches is used as the face-level score.
4.3. Comparison with other methods
We compare our method with prior work on the SwapMe
test set. The code for prior work is either provided by the au-
thors or obtained from publicly available implementations
on GitHub 1 [25]. The details of the methods and baselines
are as follows.
Face classification stream. Only the output of the face
classification CNN is used as the face tampering detection
score.
Patch triplet stream. Only the patch triplet stream is
used for detection of tampered faces.
Steganalysis features [16] + SVM. We train a linear
SVM model directly on the features extracted from the ste-
ganalysis model [16]. This method is equivalent to remov-
ing the triplet network from our patch triplet stream.
CFA pattern [14]. This method estimates the CFA pat-
tern and uses a GMM algorithm to classify the variance
of prediction error using the estimated CFA pattern. The
output of this method is a local level tampering probability
map. For the face region, an average probability is calcu-
lated as the final score.
Improved DCT Coefficient (IDC) [4]. This method es-
timates the DCT coefficients for all the regions in the given
image to find the singly JPEG compressed regions and clas-
sifies them as tampered regions. The output of this method
is a probability map indicating tampering. To calculate the
ROC curve, we take an average of the heat map score in the
face region.
Figure 6 and Table 1 show the results on the SwapMe test
set. CFA pattern [14] does not achieve good performance.
Because images in the SwapMe dataset have been resized
1https://github.com/MKLab-ITI/image-forensics
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Figure 7. Class Activation Maps (CAMs) obtained from the face
classification network. Each row shows the original image, the
corresponding tampered face, the CAM, and a smoothing CAM
overlaid with the tampered face for better visualization. In CAMs,
red denotes high probability of tampering, and blue denotes low
probability of tampering. We can observe that our face classifi-
cation stream learns important artifacts created by the application
during face tampering, such as stitching artifacts near face bound-
aries, strong edges around lips, and blurring effect when glasses
are involved.
and the nearby pixel information is lost, this method fails
to make correct predictions. The assumption of IDC [4] is
that tampered regions are singly JPEG compressed while
the authentic regions are doubly JPEG compressed. This
is not the case in SwapMe, as both tampered regions and
authentic regions have been doubly JPEG compressed. Ste-
ganalysis features + SVM performs reasonably well.
By refining steganalysis features, our patch triplet stream
generates more informative features and obtains better re-
sult than steganalysis features + SVM (AUC improved from
0.794 to 0.875). By combining the patch triplet stream with
the face classification stream, our full method models both
high-level visual artifacts and low-level local features and
thus is robust to post processing like resizing and boundary
smoothing. As a result, it outperforms all other methods by
a large margin.
4.4. Discussion
Class Activation Map of Tampered Faces. To better
understand what visual clues the face classification stream
relies on to detect a tampered face, we follow the method
Original Tampered CAM SVM score map
Figure 8. Heat map visualization of our two-stream network. Each
row contains the original and tampered face, the corresponding
CAM generated in the face classification stream in and SVM score
map derived from the SVMs in the patch triplet stream. the In
CAMs, red denotes high probability of tampering, and blue de-
notes low probability of tampering. In SVM score maps, red re-
gions are more likely to be from different images other than the
tampered images. In the first example, both streams can detect the
tampered face. In the second and third examples, one stream fails
while the other stream works, and fusing two streams successfully
detects the tampered faces. Last row shows a failure case when the
input face is small.
used in [26] to generate Class Activation Maps (CAMs)
from the GoogLeNet, which are shown in Figure 7. Since
the last feature map before the global average pooling layer
in GoogLeNet is of size 8 × 8 × 2048, the CAM for each
face is of size 8×8. As shown in Figure 7, it is clear that our
method learns the tampering artifacts created by the appli-
cations. The network is able to detect the stitching artifacts
near the boundary of faces (as in the first two examples),
strong edges near lips (as in the third example), and some
blurring effect near eyes when glasses are involved during
the tampering (last example). This visualization indicates
that our approach is able to learn reasonable features that
are useful for tampering detection.
Effectiveness of Two-stream Fusion. By fusing the de-
tection scores of two streams, our method achieves better
performance than each individual stream by a large margin.
In Figure 8, we show some examples to visualize the de-
tection results of both streams. In the first example, both
streams can detect the tampered face - the face classifica-
SwapMe test FaceSwap test
SwapMe train 0.995 0.829
FaceSwap train 0.854 0.998
SwapMe + FaceSwap train 0.995 0.999
Table 2. AUC of face classification stream comparison using dif-
ferent training and test splits. The row is the training dataset and
the column is the test dataset.
tion stream detects the unnatural edges near the mouth and
beard, and the patch triplet network discovers the differ-
ent noise residual distributions of the tampered region. In
the second and third examples, only one stream is able to
detect the tampering; however, with our two-stream fusion
scheme, combining two streams detects the tampered face
effectively. Our method fails to detect very small tampered
faces as shown in the last example in Figure 8. In this ex-
ample, the face is only of size 50× 50. Since our face clas-
sification stream needs to resize the input face to 299×299,
the upsampling of small faces loses some crucial visual in-
formation for tampering detection. Moreover, the patch size
of our patch triplet stream is 128 × 128, which makes our
method less robust when the tampered face is small because
a large portion of the input patch will be authentic regions.
Tampered Face Detection in Different Protocols. In
addition to training on FaceSwap and testing on SwapMe,
we report the results of different protocols in Table 2. The
row is the training dataset and the column is the test dataset.
We use 705 tampered + 1400 authentic images for training
and 300 tampered + 300 authentic images for test when both
training and testing are from the same dataset. We use 705
× 2 + 1400 images for training and 300 tampered + 300
authentic images for test when training on both SwapMe
and FaceSwap and testing on one of them. The near perfect
performance on either SwapMe or FaceSwap test set when
training on common datasets indicates that our face classi-
fication stream has learned application-specific features.
5. Conclusion
We described a two-stream tampered face detection tech-
nique, where one stream detects low-level inconsistencies
between image patches and another stream explicitly de-
tects tamper faces. To evaluate our approach, we created a
new data set that is challenging as multiple post processing
are applied to the spliced region. The experimental results
show that our approach outperforms other methods because
it is able to learn both tampering artifacts and hidden noise
residual features. Since our method needs steganalysis fea-
tures extraction for the triplet network, an end-to-end archi-
tecture design is worth investigating and will be one of the
main directions for future research.
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